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I.  Introduction 
The British Petroleum (BP) Oil Spill and Restitution are irresistible 
topics for exploration.  Just as systems errors combined to cause the disaster 
in the Gulf of Mexico,1 the most human of institutions, the law, has 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law.  David 
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 1. Peter Elkind, David Whitford & Doris Burke, An Accident Waiting to Happen, 
FORTUNE, 163(2), 105–32 (2011).  Only a year later were the causes being isolated to show 
design failures inherent in blowout preventers throughout the industry.  Final Report for 
United States Department of the Interior, Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon 
Blowout Preventer, Report No. EPO30842, 20 Mar. 2011; ROBERT CAVNAR, DISASTER ON 
THE HORIZON:  HIGH STAKES, HIGH RISKS, AND THE STORY BEHIND THE DEEPWATER WELL 
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struggled to find a proper way to respond.  After the blowout, BP struggled 
to find a solution to an ongoing disaster of immense proportions.2  Over the 
next six months, before BP was finally able to seal the deepwater well, 
more than four million barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf of Mexico,3 
coating the ocean floor with oil,4 drenching birds and other wildlife in oil,5 
and depositing oil and tar balls on the beaches of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas.6  Responding to this unprecedented disaster, the press bayed, 
victims cried for relief, and the wider American public was galvanized to 
demand "justice," "retribution," and "accountability."  The Federal 
government, chastened by the pinch of public opinion, as well as by the 
demands of the affected states who were clamoring to satisfy their citizens’ 
                                                                                                                 
BLOWOUT (2010).  The United States Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation & Enforcement (BOEMRE) completed their joint investigation 
into the expolsion and fire on board the Deepwater Hroizon.  Deepwater Horizon Joint 
Investigation Team, Final Investigative Report (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http:www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/1193483 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  The BOEMRE report, dated September 
14, 2011, states that the accident and the subsequent pollution "were the result of poor risk 
management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical 
indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response 
training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling . . . [and operations]."  Id. vol. 
II, at 1–2. 
 2. See Frank James, Burning Oil Rig Sinks in Gulf of Mexico; 11 Still Missing, 
National Public Radio (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/04/ 
burning_oil_rig_sinks_in_gulf.html (last visited May 18, 2011) (describing the explosion 
and sinking of the rig and the initial failure to stop the leaking of oil) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Richard Harris, Scientists Find Thick Layer of Oil on Ocean Sea Floor, 
National Public Radio (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=129782098 (last visited May 18, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. See id. (detailing the scientific studies of the Gulf of Mexico, which revealed that 
the escaped oil covered the ocean floor up to two inches in some areas).  
 5. See Elizabeth Shogren, Plight for Pelicans:  Oil Puts Nesting Season at Risk, 
National Public Radio (June 9, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=127579474 (last visited May 18, 2011) (describing the rescue efforts to save birds and 
other wildlife affected by the oil spill) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See NPR Staff & Wires, Way Too Early for Optimism on Oil Spill, Obama Says, 
National Public Radio (June 4, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=127396580 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (stating that tar balls were washing up on the 
beaches of Louisiana and Florida) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
David Schaper, Tar Balls From Gulf Spill Wash Up on Texas Coast, National Public Radio 
(July 5, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128321208 (last 
visited May 18, 2011) ("The area of the Gulf Coast now affected by oil from the still gushing 
blown-out BP well now stretches 550 miles east to west, from the Florida Panhandle to 
Galveston.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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demands and avoid economic imposts, was under great pressure to respond.  
Eventually the well was capped with impressive engineering feats at a 
depth challenging the limits of technology. 
It was in the witches’ brew of fraught politics, environmental policy 
views, overlapping and complex laws, and uncompromising disputation, 
that BP and the federal government found themselves across a table 
attempting to cap the stream of vitriol.7  The result was the much-vaunted 
BP compensation fund created to compensate those damaged by the spill.  
Prior to creating the fund, BP had been handling claims in an ad hoc 
fashion, trying to deliver compensation to victims, to apply resources to 
spill abatement, and to assist the Coast Guard.  BP had also been 
hemorrhaging from public reactions and missteps that inflamed public 
opinion, and there was a compelling need for a far-ranging response.  The 
range of potential victims was quite large, with the explosion and leak 
having caused devastating human and economic losses in the Gulf region.  
These effects will undoubtedly ripple through the Gulf economy and the 
court system for years to come.  Those most obviously and directly affected 
were the fishermen and those associated with the tourist industry (e.g., 
hotels, restaurants, stores) in the area closest to the spill.  However, many 
others have been affected, including oil drillers who are precluded from 
working, and state and federal governments, which have incurred both 
clean-up costs for beaches and estuaries and lost revenue from tourism and 
fishing. 
BP and others have been heavily criticized for their lack of 
preparedness for a major disaster.8  Government officials, exhibiting much 
sturm und drang, were, in fact, caught completely flatfooted.  As we 
describe in Part II, the parties were faced with overlapping and 
contradictory liability regimes.  The common law rule inherited from 
Robins Dry Dock9 precluded a broad recovery of economic losses, and most 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Elkind et al., supra note 1, at 105–32 (reporting on CEO Tony Hayward’s 
public statements). 
 8. See id. (describing how BP’s management did not institute a safety policy 
designed for large catastrophes).  It is noteworthy that the fixing of blame and consequent 
criminal litigation was still unresolved in April 2011.  The Justice Department announced on 
March 7, 2011, that it was creating a special task force headed by John Buretta.  Molly 
McDonough, DOJ Quietly Overhauls BP Oil Spill Probe, ABA J. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2011, 3:00 
PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/doj_quietly_overhauls_bp_oil_spill_probe/ 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  On the issue 
of criminal prosecutions, the possible bases and their strengths and weaknesses and the 
rationales are examined by David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone:  The Gulf of Mexico, 
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011). 
 9. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307–09 (1927) ("[A] 
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of the losses caused by the BP oil spill were of that nature.  The Oil 
Pollution Act10—enacted by Congress as a result of the Exxon Valdez 
spill—established a regime that would allow for a slightly broader recovery 
capped at $75 million from a $1 billion fund from which compensation 
could be drawn.  In the BP situation, politicians knew that something had to 
be done to "kill" the political carnage, and the $20 billion fund was 
designed to achieve that objective—to cut the line and fill it with the heavy 
mud and cement of a huge funnel.  Some order had to be salvaged from the 
chaos of the ad hoc system that had been put in place. 
The BP fund, which was quite large, was to be administered by 
Kenneth Feinberg, who had been much admired for his work with the 9/11 
Fund.  The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) was created to assist him.  
We conclude that the fund created a far from perfect solution to a difficult 
problem.  In the stress of the rush to compensate victims, the fund failed to 
achieve the benefits that the parties desired.  Its confused structure instilled 
suspicion among claimants who are being wooed by an alternative suitor—
a large class action lawsuit—in which more lucrative damages are 
promised. 
We argue that the best chance for the GCCF to efficiently attract 
claimants, and deliver quick compensation, was lost in the very structure of 
the fund.  The "losers" in that system will be claimants and defendants who 
will be forced to choose between living with the vagaries of the common 
law system or accepting compensation from the trust fund system.  The 
GCCF, despite its structure as a "Trust Fund," functions as a general pool of 
money assigned for payment by Mr. Feinberg under his published 
protocols, and for BP as it decides how to settle claims.  From the structure 
of the arrangement, it appears that Mr. Feinberg is not a true "third-party 
neutral such as a mediator, arbitrator, or court-appointed special master,"11 
and the Federal District Court administering the class action required BP, 
through its agents Feinberg and GCCF, to advise claimants of this fact.12  It 
should be noted, however, that Feinberg may negotiate and settle claims 
                                                                                                                 
tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another 
merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer 
of the wrong."). 
 10. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2010) (extending strict liability 
on responsible parties for oil spills and establishing a trust fund to reimburse victims).  
 11. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). 
 12. See id. at *7 ("A full disclosure of the relationship between Mr. Feinberg, the 
GCCF, and BP will at least make transparent that it is BP’s interests as the OPA responsible 
party that are being promoted.").  
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without BP’s assent, a fact that should have been given greater emphasis by 
Judge Barbier when assessing Feinberg’s independence.13 
In establishing the BP trust fund and the GCCF structure, BP failed to 
hew to a tenet of ordinary legal arrangements—the need to consider agency 
costs.  BP’s ability to draw from the fund and to exercise power over the 
administrator exacerbates the fears of claimants that settlements will not be 
maximally for their benefit.  A prime reason, we will see, for the law’s 
imposition of strict fiduciary duties, as well as for the Restatement 
disgorgement provision for opportunistic breach, is to ensure a punctilious 
respect for the interests of those who are vulnerable in the transactions in 
question.  Thus, under the Restatement, relational contracts are sustained by 
the rules’ strict bonding mechanisms.  Alas, the GCCF fails at the starting 
gate.  This argument is made in the final section where we also argue that a 
structure giving independence to Mr. Feinberg and tying him to fiduciary 
obligations and potential restitution claims would be a step forward.  The 
failures of the BP arrangement should serve as a lesson to those seeking to 
build better structures for the compensation of the widespread injury-
producing occurrences that will inevitably dot our futures.14  Here is the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. This is not to say that BP is unaffected by Feinberg’s settlement and compensation 
actions.  It has criticized Feinberg for being too generous.  See Catherine Clifford, BP:  
Feinberg’s Gulf Oil Spill Payments Are Too Generous, CNN MONEY, (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/17/smallbusiness/bp_payments_generous/index.htm (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011) (stating that BP was ill-advised to give public voice to its misgivings 
because the GCCF independence is paramount) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 14. The top 10 spills are as follows:   
1989 Exxon Valdez* 11.3 Million Gallons 
2010 Deepwater Horizon 206.2 
1979 IXTOC 1  147.8 
1983 Nowruz 4  82.1 
1971 Wodeco 3  18.5 
1978 Escravos  13.9 
1980 Funiwa No. 5  8.6 
1977 Phillips Ekofisk 8.5 
1969 Union Oil Platform 4.2 
1980 Ron Tappmeyer 4.2 
1970 Chevron Main Pass 2.7 
*The Valdez spill resulted from a tanker accident.  Source:  Paul Scherrer Institute. 
Responses to mass disasters vary on the basis of whether they are "man-made" or 
natural.  Limits of markets will dictate that government intervene to support insurance 
markets and provide succor for victims.  See Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles for Government in 
Compensating Disaster Victims, in DANIEL A. FARBER & MICHAEL G. FAURE, DISASTER LAW 
1346 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341 (2011) 
thesis of the article.  In designing a compensation scheme to compete 
against tort compensation, it is vital to recognize that claimants’ trust and 
confidence in the scheme must be garnered through mechanisms that will 
include strong claims for restitution by claimants.  The Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment gives courts clear rules to sustain these 
restitution claims. 
II.  Compensation and Mass Torts:  Alternatives 
No one living in the United States could have easily avoided the daily 
barrage of news coverage of the oil spill that resulted from the blowout of 
the Macondo well.  The Deepwater Horizon exploded on April 20, 2010, 
and while the fire was being fought on the platform, Transocean and BP 
began assessing and attempting to stop the oil flowing from the ruptured 
well.  The well topped a reservoir of some 110 million barrels of oil, more 
than 13,000 feet below the sea floor.  The depth of the Gulf at this point is 
about 5,000 feet.  Oil streamed from the ruptured wellhead for the next 
eighty-seven days.  The final staunching of the flow came as a giant relief, 
but the lack of planning for a deepwater cataclysm and the insouciance of 
governmental oversight and regulation remained apparent.  The National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 
presents an important case study that one hopes will provide lessons for 
industry and government.  As a staff paper points out, the energy and 
resources of BP, government, and scientists brought to the task over those 
eighty-seven days were remarkable.15  Technologies were developed on the 
fly, and government galvanized to monitor and advise.  Despite all these 
efforts, tremendous destruction was wrought—workers died from the 
explosion, livelihoods were diminished, the ocean was polluted, wildlife 
was killed, and commerce was disjointed. 
Oil spills are not new to the American people, and the capacity for 
environmental destruction is written large in the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  
That disaster occurred on March 24, 1989, when the Exxon Valdez oil 
tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska.16  Over 
                                                                                                                 
507–40 (2010) (examining how victim compensation from the government can be a useful 
tool instead of tort action). 
 15. See CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON 
OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ 
chief-counsels-report (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (describing the numerous attempts by BP to 
stop the flow) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See William Yardley, Recovery Still Incomplete After Valdez Spill, N.Y. TIMES 
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the next few days, the tanker discharged some 11 million gallons of oil into 
the Sound, in the process "staining 1,500 miles of coastline, killing 
hundreds of thousands of seabirds, otters, seals and whales, and devastating 
local communities."17  The effects of the oil spill linger even today, more 
than two decades later, with young people unable to pursue careers in 
fishing, leaving a "jaded" group of residents, along with other ongoing 
effects:  The "mountain views are still stunning but the herring fishery is 
gone, the king and Dungeness crabs, too.  Prawns are coming back, but just 
barely."18  Although residents ultimately received payments from Exxon, 
many of the payments have proven to be too low to allow individuals to 
rebuild their lives.19 
As with the BP Oil Spill, the Exxon Valdez incident caused major 
losses to persons who rely on the natural environment.  Although the effects 
have been broadly felt by those in the vicinity, the economic losses range 
far beyond, drawing into consideration the limits of legal and public policy.  
Even for gross negligence, as was evident in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,20 
                                                                                                                 
(May 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/us/06alaska.html?_r=1&ref=exxon 
valdezoilspill1989 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) ("As the oil spill spreads ominously in the Gulf 
of Mexico, its impact uncertain, communities here beside Prince William Sound are still 
confronting the consequences of March 24, 1989, the day of the wreck of the Exxon 
Valdez.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  However, some have questioned whether the loss of herring fishing was due to 
the spill or to other causes.  Id. ("The loss of the herring industry over the years since the 
spill has cost the region about $400 million . . . although some blame cyclical patterns or 
other factors for the change, not the spill."). 
 19. See id.  The article recites the example of one fisherman: 
In December, Exxon sent the last of a nearly $500,000 payment to John Platt, 
but Mr. Platt said he never saw it.  Straight to the state and the bank it went, to 
clear the liens on his boats and his fishing permits, to dig out of the debt he 
accumulated, some through his own admitted missteps, in the two decades since 
the wreck of the Valdez.  
The payments were initially supposed to be much higher, before Exxon 
successfully fought, all the way to the Supreme Court, to have them reduced. 
"The money was supposed to bring closure," Mr. Platt said. "Deep down inside I 
was really banking on it, but it didn’t happen." 
Id. 
 20. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 509–15 (2008) (finding that 
Exxon’s actions were "worse than negligent but less than malicious" and that the maximum 
award of punitive damages allowed was equal to the jury’s award of $507.5 million in 
compensatory damages). 
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we must draw a line, as does the U.S. Supreme Court in awarding punitive 
damages that are now constrained by a judicially imposed ratio.21 
As huge efforts were being made to cap the BP oil well, the drama of 
multiple claims for loss by those affected by the spill was at full throttle.  It 
soon became apparent that the issue of how to provide compensation for the 
victims of the oil spill would be every bit as difficult as the technological 
obstacles encountered in capping the well.  As engineers struggled to stem 
the flow of oil, BP and the government faced a daunting picture in trying to 
assess liability and provide compensation.  As the nation witnessed with the 
Exxon Valdez incident, and the compensation fund established following 
the 9/11 Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers,22 the tort 
system has provided a poor mechanism for resolving claims and meting out 
compensation to victims.23  The establishment of a fund through insurance 
mechanisms may in addition be an effective deterrence to social ills that 
cause harm to citizens.24 
Following the Exxon Valdez incident, Congress enacted the Federal 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)25 that extended liability by imposing strict 
liability on responsible parties for certain economic losses in navigable 
waters and along shorelines.  The legislation involved a consolidation of 
previous piecemeal legislation, and established the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund that was authorized to pay out to a maximum of $1 billion per 
incident.  The fund was financed by taxes on crude oil bought by U.S. 
refineries and on petroleum products imported, consumed, and stored in the 
United States. 
The OPA establishes a cap of $75 million per responsible party per 
incident.  Under Section 2704(c)(1), the cap does not apply "if the incident 
was proximately caused by: 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See id. at 513 ("[A] 1:1 ratio . . . is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases."). 
 22. See Mireya Navarro, There’s Room on His Plate, 9/11 Mediator Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2010), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/theres-room-on-his-plate-
mediator-insists/?scp=33&sq=9%2F11+trust+fund&st=nyt (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) 
(detailing the many problems faced during the settlement of lawsuits between New York 
City and ground zero rescue and cleanup workers) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 23. See Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of 
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 289–93 (2003) (describing the stigmatization of 
blameless victims that inhibits the compensation process). 
 24. See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 268, 269 (2003) ("Future political actors may evaluate private responses to 
the risk of terrorism in deciding on the character or degree of a governmental response.").  
 25. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2010). 
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(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or 
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, consultation, or 
operating regulation, by the responsible party . . . ."26 
Absent the legislation, those aggrieved by the BP oil spill would have 
had some avenues of redress.  They could have brought an action under the 
OPA or under the maritime law applicable to the claim.  However, this 
avenue of redress was deemed insufficient by potential claimants and the 
various governmental entities.  Under a barrage of adverse publicity, BP 
officials and President Obama met and executed an agreement on January 
16, 2010, to create a compensation fund for the victims of the spill.  BP 
pledged a minimum of $20 billion to the fund over forty months, with 
security provided.  BP’s establishment of the funds, with claims to be 
processed through the GCCF and Mr. Kenneth Feinberg as the 
administrator, staunched, as did the capping of the well, the fierce criticism 
to which BP was being subjected.  But, like the well capping, the trust fund 
left a myriad of issues to be resolved.  Under the fund, Feinberg was not 
being asked to make compensation payments based on the expected liability 
of BP and others who may have responsibility for the oil spill, but rather on 
the basis of criteria that he established.27  As a result, claimants continue to 
have statutory and common law claims against BP or other parties.  
However, if a claimant accepts a final payment from the GCCF fund, the 
claimant must waive other rights of action.28 
Although Mr. Feinberg has maintained that his decisions on whether to 
pay claims under the GCCF does not depend on enforceable rights in law, 
the background is important in ascertaining the scope of liability and 
influencing the criteria for payment that he will make.  At Mr. Feinberg’s 
request, Professor John Goldberg of Harvard has provided a closely 
reasoned and compelling analysis of liability that might accrue based on the 
OPA and the common law.29 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. § 2704(c)(1).  
 27. See DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUST, (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.bp.com/ 
liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_ass
ets/downloads_pdfs/Trust_Agreement_Executed_Copy.pdf (describing the structure of the 
trust fund created by Feinberg).   
 28. See PROTOCOL FOR FINAL CLAIMS, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) ("Claimants who 
accept a Final Payment must sign a Release. . . .  The Release will waive any rights the 
Claimant may have against BP and any other potentially liable parties . . . .") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. John Goldberg, Memorandum to Kenneth R. Feinberg with Report on Liability for 
Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 22, 2010), 
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It is not our intention to review exhaustively Professor Goldberg’s 
analysis, but a brief review is in order.  In short, Goldberg concludes that 
BP’s common law liability depends upon a showing of personal or property 
loss caused by the spill.  If such loss is shown, economic loss consequent to 
that loss will be recoverable.  In addition, the OPA allows for recovery of 
economic losses that flow from the destruction of resources that the 
claimant could have exploited to his economic benefit.  This confirms the 
approach of some courts that allow recovery of losses that flow from 
destruction of fish stocks to which the fisherman had a right or privilege to 
exploit.30  While the fisherman may hold no property interest in the fish 
stocks, they do hold something approaching a property interest, and they (as 
a class) are easily distinguishable from the vast class of persons who will 
suffer economic loss because of the event.31 
A.  The Structure of the Fund 
In creating the BP trust fund, the challenge for both BP and the 
government was to provide claimants with confidence that all legitimate 
claims would be covered.  Only a generous gesture and subsequent 
confidence-building moves would be sufficient.  BP started by accepting 
designation as "the responsible party" under the Oil Pollution Act.  Once it 
did, BP was obliged to establish a claims process for legitimate claims.  
This it did through the GCCF, to which all existing claims were transmitted.  
The documents establish a $20 billion fund that is held beyond the control 
of BP in an irrevocable trust with patently independent and experienced 
trustees having been named.  The appointment of a seasoned and trusted 
                                                                                                                 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4595438 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 30. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568–70 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that 
fishermen could recover from an oil company for an oil spill in California because the 
company had a duty to commercial fishermen to conduct their offshore drilling and 
production in a reasonably prudent manner and that the spill disrupted the fishermen’s 
economic and personal affairs).  
 31. See Louisiana, ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that various plaintiffs, including shipping interests, boat operators, seafood 
enterprises, tackle and bait shops, and recreational fishermen, who sustained no physical 
damage to property as result of chemical spill in Mississippi River, could not recover against 
those entities allegedly responsible for the spill).  The issue of the classes of claimants who 
may have viable claims under maritime law applicable to the spill that occurred on the 
continental shelf was ruled on by Judge Barbier recently, see In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 
3805746 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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administrator was made, in an effort to inspire confidence by payment of 
early emergency claims, and he was required to be accessible and active in 
informing claimants and offering transparency in performance.  All the 
foregoing steps were designed to inculcate trust and encourage claimants to 
forgo the tort system for claims as a final resolution. 
The design of the BP trust fund, however, suffers from several fatal 
flaws.  The trust, which is subject to Delaware law, establishes the payment 
scheme.  Through the administrator, the trust requires that funds be 
distributed to claimants, and it refers to the trust’s beneficiaries as the 
"holders of resolved Damage Claims."  The usual disclosures required of 
trustees to beneficiaries are excluded in Article IX, Section B, which 
provides, in particular, for non-disclosure of the amount of distribution to, 
or identify of, any other beneficiary.32  Under the GCCF trust document, the 
Trustees are required to distribute funds according to the direction of the 
Claim Administrator—Mr. Feinberg—or according to the direction of BP 
itself.  The trustees monitor the activities of the Corporate Trustee, 
Citibank, but do not exercise any oversight over the Administrator.  The 
individual trustees, the Corporate Trustee, and the "Lead Paying Agent" 
(also Citibank), are held harmless and are exonerated from liability on 
account of "any honest error of judgment" or for harm caused without 
"willful misconduct or negligence," under Art. VI, Section E.4.33  Trustees 
likewise are given exoneration for non-negligent or willfully wrongful acts.  
The Administrator, however, is not so indemnified under the Trust 
Agreement—rather, BP indemnifies Mr. Feinberg for his actions "relating 
to or arising from the operation of the GCCF" in his personal contract with 
BP.34 
B.  Compensation Distribution and Criteria 
The GCCF distinguishes between two types of payments that private 
claimants may seek:  Emergency Advance Payments (that were available 
only through November 23, 2010), and Final Payments (available through 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUST, supra note 27, art. IX, § B ("The 
Trustees shall have no obligation to provide the Beneficiaries with any report (annual or 
otherwise), accounting or any other information with respect to the Trust’s administration, 
distributions of the Trust Fund or any other aspect of the Trust . . . ."). 
 33. See id.  
 34. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico on Apr. 
20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). 
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August 23, 2013).  The Protocol for Emergency Advance Payments, 
promulgated August 23, 2010, was the initial statement of claim eligibility.  
In February 2011, the GCCF posted a Protocol for Final Claims, and a 
proposed final payment evaluation methodology.  In the latter, the GCCF 
provides: 
All individuals and businesses that incurred losses due to the Oil Spill 
are entitled to and are encouraged to file a Final or Interim Claim with 
the GCCF.  Neither physical proximity to the Oil Spill nor a particular 
type of work or business engaged in by the claimant is a prerequisite to 
eligibility for payment of a claim.  But adequate documentation of 
damage attributable to the Oil Spill is required.  Physical proximity to 
the Oil Spill, and the nature of the business or work engaged in by the 
claimant, are important factors when it comes to the proof needed to 
document a claim that the damage was caused by the Oil Spill.  The 
ability of the claimant to link the alleged damage to the Oil Spill—as 
opposed to other factors such as a general downturn in the Gulf region 
economy or other financial uncertainty unrelated to the Oil Spill—is 
required.35 
The legitimacy of claims is guided by conformity to the OPA and 
applicable federal maritime law.  Claims require documentation or other 
evidence for each type of damage claimed.  Physical proximity to the spill 
is not dispositive of proximate causation; Mr. Feinberg reiterated this point 
in the face of political pressure from potential Floridian claimants.36  Under 
both the Emergency Protocol and the Final Payment protocol, the 
Administrator has stipulated the types of losses for which a claim may be 
submitted.  Included are damages for removal and cleanup costs, real and 
personal property loss, lost profits and lost earning capacity, subsistence use 
of natural resources, physical injury and death, and the costs of existing 
damages.37  Collateral compensation, including "[a]ny other earnings or 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Final Rules Governing Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria, 
and Final Payment Methodology, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY at 2 (Feb. 18, 2011) 
[hereinafter Final Rules], available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINAL_ 
RULES.pdf. 
 36. See Jill Snyder & JoAnne Norton, Feinberg Says Proximity Won’t Be Weighed in 
BP Claims, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
04/feinberg-says-proximity-won-t-affect-bp-claim-being-processed.html (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011) ("Kenneth Feinberg, who is responsible for compensating victims of [BP’s] Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill, said geographic proximity won’t affect the processing of an individual or 
business claim.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. Such is in conformance with the mandates of the OPA, which explicitly 
contemplates damages recoverable from responsible parties by private claimants: 
(B) Real or personal property.  Damages for injury to, or economic losses 
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be 
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profits [the claimant] received from another job or another source of 
earnings or profits during the period for which [the claimant is] claiming 
lost earnings or profits," is deducted from Final Payments. 
The Protocol references an essential matter in play in our analysis.  
The "determinations of claims under the OPA will be guided by the OPA.  
Determinations of physical injury or death claims will be guided . . . by 
other federal law or pertinent state laws."38  The protocol contemplates 
payments that tightly follow the contours of liability and the OPA and State 
common law and statutes.  It is supposed that payments will be made along 
the interpretation of the law rendered by John Goldberg. 
As noted, the GCCF posted for public comment a proposal for the 
final evaluation protocol on February 2, 2011.39  This document further 
explains evidentiary requirements and lays out specific payment policies.  
The most notable aspect of the proposal was its Final Payment calculus, 
which provided as follows: 
Each claimant’s Final Payment offer will be the larger of:  (1) Two 
times each eligible Claimant’s 2010 Actual Documented Losses (except 
for claimants with 2010 losses in excess of $500,000); four times each 
eligible oyster harvester’s 2010 Actual Documented Losses, or (2) The 
total actual documented losses through the date of the filing of the Final 
Claim.40 
The proposal’s appendices contain sample payment calculations (Exhibits 
A, B), and detailed support for the GCCF’s determination that the Gulf will 
largely recover by 2012 (Exhibits C, D, E).  Such a proposition underlies 
Feinberg’s payment multiplier. 
                                                                                                                 
recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property. 
(C) Subsistence use.  Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, 
which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources which 
have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or 
management of the resources. . . .  
(E) Profits and earning capacity.  Damages equal to the loss of profits or 
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real 
property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by 
any claimant.  
33 U.S.C. § 2702. 
 38. See PROTOCOL FOR FINAL CLAIMS, supra note 28. 
 39. See Final Rules, supra note 35, at 1 ("In an effort to promote full disclosure and 
transparency, the GCCF’s Announcement requested public comment during the period 
February 2 through February 16, 2011, from all claimants and other interested parties.").  
 40. Id. at 6. 
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Of general interest may be the public comments themselves, which the 
GCCF posts daily on its website.41  If nothing else, the responses give one a 
sense of the variety of potentially disappointed claimants (including, for 
example, the full-time student who inquires as to the calculation of 
compensation for loss of chance in a diminished job market). 
The Protocol assumes that some false or fraudulent claims will be 
submitted.  The Protocol attempts to deal with this problem, in part, by 
requiring claimants to declare that the information submitted in support of 
their claims is "true and accurate," and seeks to make it clear to them that 
false or fraudulent statements might be subject to criminal and civil 
penalties.  The latter penalties are not spelt out. 
There is no apparent scheme for parceling out the $20 billion corpus 
equitably between claimants; the trust document provides merely that the 
Facility must make payments in the order Feinberg authorizes them.  
Though Feinberg would presumably account for limited fund scarcity in 
exercising his discretion, it seems likely that he will authorize claims—and 
thus that claims will be paid out—on the basis of first-in-time filing (or 
rather, of first-in-time perfection under the applicable protocol).  BP itself 
has rejected suggestions that GCCF’s $20 billion will serve as a liability 
cap, though it is unclear whether excess claims would produce further BP 
contributions to the Facility, or be available only through actions against 
BP.  Most recently, Feinberg has suggested that he expects to satisfy all 
claims for about $10 billion, expending half the corpus.42  Much of this 
turns on predictions that the ecosystem will return to health quite quickly in 
the bacteria laden waters of the Gulf.43 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See E-MAIL COMMENTS CONCERNING DRAFT METHODOLOGY AND ELIGIBILITY 
CRITERIA, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/methodology_email.php (last visited Oct. 
5, 2011) (publishing thousands of daily comments) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 42. See Brian Swint, BP Reinstates Dividend After Profit Increase, Plans to Sell Two 
Refineries, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/bp-
reinstates-quarterly-dividend-after-fourth-quarter-profit-increases-30-.html (last visited Oct. 
5, 2011) ("Kenneth Feinberg, who is administering the fund, said in a Dec. 31 Bloomberg 
Television interview that $10 billion may be ‘more than enough to pay all the claims.’") (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. See Claudia Dreifus, Revisiting the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 2011, at D3 (describing the devastating ecological effects of the spill on the seafloor and 
how bacteria in the water eat oil).  
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C.  Terms of Release 
A claim for Emergency Advance Payment does not require waiver or 
release of any right; a reimbursed claimant may still pursue an action 
against BP or file a claim against the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.  
To receive a Final Payment, however, a claimant must sign a release—thus, 
acceptance becomes a critical decision point for claimants. 
The Release will waive any rights the Claimant may have against BP 
and any other potentially liable parties to assert additional claims, to file 
an individual legal action, to participate in other legal actions associated 
with the Spill, or to submit any claim for payment by the National 
Pollution Funds Center.  However, except where the Claimant accepts a 
Final Payment for physical injury or death, the Release will not waive 
the Claimant’s rights with regard to a physical injury or death claim.  If 
the Claimant elects to accept a Final Payment for a claim for physical 
injury or death, the Claimant will return to the GCCF a Release 
specifically waiving the Claimant’s rights with regard to the Claimant’s 
physical injury or death claim.44 
Under the Protocol, the Claimant has a right to appeal the 
determination of a Final Payment.  The appeal is reviewed by a panel 
appointed by the Claims Administrator who is required to select "one 
distinguished member of the legal profession . . . who will identify 
distinguished members of the legal community . . . to serve as impartial 
GCCF Appeals Judges."45  A panel of three approved GCCF judges are 
appointed once an "appeal is certified."46  The decision is binding on BP, 
but a claimant may pursue other remedies at law.  It is of note, however, 
that a claimant who accepts an insufficient Final Payment from the GCCF 
may still present his claim to the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.47 
D.  Compensation in a Sea of Tort 
Although the 9/11 Compensation Fund was fraught with human 
tragedy, and thus required deft and sensitive administration, the road was 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See PROTOCOL FOR FINAL CLAIMS, supra note 28. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713 (2010) ("If a claim is presented [first to the responsible 
party] . . . and full and adequate compensation is unavailable, a claim for the uncompensated 
damages and removal costs may be presented to the Fund.").  Congress may appropriate up 
to $1 billion for the Fund. 
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clear of the conflicting tensions surrounding the BP Oil Spill.  Nothing 
reveals this more strongly than a recent ruling on February 2, 2011 by 
Judge Barbier in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana 
who has been charged with administering the class action.48  The decision 
declares that BP is not only the OPA "responsible party," but is also a 
"primary defendant in the MDL and consolidated putative class actions."49  
Under Rule 23, the Court has inherent authority and responsibility to 
supervise or control communications with class members, particularly when 
unrepresented by their own counsel to ensure that putative class members 
do not receive inaccurate or misleading communications.50  At issue was 
the claim by Mr. Feinberg that he enjoyed independence from BP and was 
not its agent in his actions in administering the GCCF.51  The Court noted 
that BP’s statutory obligations under the OPA were non-delegable and thus 
could not be delegated either to Mr. Feinberg or to the GCCF.52  In 
addition, the court found indicia of BP’s control over Mr. Feinberg and the 
GCCF, all of which tended to undermine their independence:  BP’s 
responsibility for paying Mr. Feinberg’s salary; BP’s right to exercise 
control under the employment contract; BP’s indemnification of Mr. 
Feinberg; BP’s authority to terminate Mr. Feinberg for cause; Mr. 
Feinberg’s covenant to comply with the corporate conduct code; and BP’s 
right to make a quarterly reevaluation of Mr. Feinberg’s fees.53  The judge 
described Mr. Feinberg and the GCCF as performing a hybrid function, 
which he opined has led to confusion and misunderstanding by claimants.54  
                                                                                                                 
 48. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico on 
Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *6, *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011) (finding 
that Feinberg and the GCCF are not totally independent of BP and that they should inform 
claimants of that connection with BP).  
 49. Id. at *6.  
 50. See id. (describing how the court has the authority to control communications to 
potential class members prior to the certification of them as a class).  
 51. See id. at *3 ("BP insists that Mr. Feinberg is solely responsible for administering 
the GCCF, that he developed the protocols and Release, and that he does not report to BP."). 
 52. See id. at *5 ("To fulfill its statutory obligations, BP has created the GCCF, which 
is administered by Mr. Feinberg and his law firm, Feinberg Rozen, LLP. The fact that BP in 
this instance has chosen to delegate this responsibility cannot relieve BP of its statutory 
obligations."). 
 53. See id. at *5–6 (stating the court’s reasons for why Feinberg and the GCCF are not 
independent of BP).  
 54. See id. at *7 ("Because the Court finds that the hybrid role of Mr. Feinberg and the 
GCCF has led to confusion and misunderstanding by claimants, especially those who are 
unrepresented by their own counsel, the Court finds that certain precautions should be taken 
to protect the interests of claimants . . . ."). 
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Using that reasoning, the court ordered that BP "through its agents" Mr. 
Feinberg and the GCCF: 
(1) Refrain from contacting directly any claimant that they know or 
reasonably should know is represented by counsel, whether or 
not said claimant has filed a lawsuit or formal claim; 
(2) Refrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or Feinberg 
Rozen, LLP (or their representatives), as "neutral" or completely 
"independent" from BP.  It should be clearly disclosed in all 
communications, whether written or oral, that said parties are 
acting for and on behalf of BP in fulfilling its statutory 
obligations as the "responsible party" under the OPA; 
(3) Begin any communication with a putative class member with 
the statement that the individual has a right to consult with an 
attorney of his/her own choosing prior to accepting any 
settlement or signing a release of legal rights; and 
(4) Refrain from giving or purporting to give legal advice to 
unrepresented claimants . . . .55 
Judge Barbier found that, because claimants who agreed to a final 
payment must sign a release of all claims against all defendants, BP 
benefited by discharging its liability.56  The speeches and information 
provided by Mr. Feinberg extolling the advantages of the GCCF process 
were therefore misleading. 
Perhaps more damaging to the GCCF’s process, however, was a report 
on January 31, 2011 headed "91,000 Gulf Oil Spill Claims, Just 1 Final 
Payment."57  The records showed, it was asserted, that the one final 
payment was for $10 million and that it was a payment for which BP had 
lobbied.58  Moreover, the claim was not reviewed for merit by Mr. Feinberg 
or the GCCF.59  The report says:  "BP struck an outside deal with the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at *8.  Feinberg had been telling potential claimants to eschew hiring lawyers 
in favor of submitting GCCF claims.  Id. at *7.  
 56. See id. at *7 ("The clear record in this case demonstrates that any claim of the 
GCCF’s neutrality and independence is misleading to putative class members and is a direct 
threat to this ongoing litigation, as claimants must sign a full release against all potential 
defendants before obtaining final payments."). 
 57. Brian Skoloff, 91,000 Gulf Oil Spill Claims, Just 1 Final Payment, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/91000-gulf-oil-spill-claims-
just-1-final (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. See id. ("BP won’t identify the business, citing confidentiality, but acknowledges 
it lobbied for the settlement."). 
 59. See id. ("Feinberg said Monday the facility never reviewed that claim for merit."). 
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[claimant] and told the fund to make the payment."60  The story cites a 
litany of complaints about the "lack of transparency and independence from 
BP."61  However, the image in the minds of claimants is that the GCCF is a 
slush fund by which BP pays claims subject to its whim and self-interest.62 
Indeed, the distribution of the trust’s corpus does not fall solely within 
the bailiwick of Mr. Feinberg:  According to the Trust Agreement, the 
beneficiaries include all "holders of resolved Damage Claims."63  Included 
in the definition of "Damage Claims," however, are "amounts owed by [BP] 
pursuant to . . . settlement agreements that are resolved outside of the 
GCCF process . . . ."64  With respect to such claims, the GCCF is not 
empowered to assess "the consistency of the claim with . . . [the] settlement 
agreement."65  BP need merely submit a notice of claim payment to the 
GCCF’s bank, thereby circumventing Feinberg entirely. 
All of this springs from the basic flaw in the trust document:  It does 
not ensure Mr. Feinberg’s independence.  This flaw is surprising given that 
the fund was structured as an irrevocable trust fund and therefore seemed to 
be an appropriate payment vehicle.  However, several factors militated 
against a clear-eyed argument for independence: 
(1) The OPA arrangement, around which the structure needed to be 
built; 
(2) The haste with which the deal was constructed; 
(3) The huge interest of aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers in attracting 
claimants into their class action;  
(4) An unexamined reliance on Mr. Feinberg’s reassurances, and a 
neglect of the critical role of the institutional arrangements.  
[Perhaps this stemmed from the glow of Mr. Feinberg’s great 
success in handling the 9/11 Fund.]; and 
(5) An assumption that the very quantum of the fund would exert 
gravitational pull on claimants to opt for the GCCF and the 
compensation scheme. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally Comments Regarding the Announcement of Payment Options, 
Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria, and Final Payment Methodology, http://www. 
gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/methodology (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUST, supra note 27, Recital § 4. 
 64. Id. Recital § 3. 
 65. Id. art. II, § D, para. 3. 
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III.  Shortcomings of the Compensation Scheme 
If one has labored for long enough in the torts vineyard, one recalls 
that compensation issues were once paramount.66  The great tort scholars of 
the day, e.g., Fleming James and John Fleming, fine doctrinal scholars that 
they were, eschewed the role of tort law as delivering effective 
compensation for the haven of compensation schemes that would deliver 
more cents on the dollar to the victims of accidents.67  These were days 
before economic analysis and deterrence theory loomed large.  The most 
radical scheme was adopted by the New Zealand government in the late 
1960s when tort liability for personal injury was abolished and a 
government compensation scheme replaced it.68  At that time, Australia and 
the U.K. were close to adopting similar schemes.69  Of course, Workers’ 
Compensation, with roots in Bismarck’s Germany, was the grandparent of 
these schemes.70 
The times have changed, and strong governmental intervention is 
certainly unpopular except, under the moniker of tort reform, to the extent it 
limits the ability of plaintiffs to bring action in certain types of litigation.71  
At the same time, the costs of litigation, modern commentators have 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See generally David F. Partlett, Of Law Reform Lions and the Limits of Tort 
Reform, 27 SYD. L. REV. 417 (2005). 
 67. But modern scholars remain concerned about the inherent inefficiencies in 
delivering compensation in large complex suits.  See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 320 (2011) ("Of the roughly $7 
billion Merck will have to spend on the Vioxx litigation, approximately $3.5 billion will 
have been on attorneys’ fees, including roughly $2 billion for defense litigation fees."). 
 68. See GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY:  A STUDY OF LAW AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 69–104 (1979) (describing the debate 
over the Accident Compensation Bill, which set up a government compensation framework 
to reimburse victims of personal injury).  For a later discussion, see Peter H. Schuck, Tort 
Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008) and Stephen Todd, Treatment Injury 
in New Zealand, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1169 (2011) (describing the evolution and limits of 
the scheme). 
 69. See Palmer, supra note 68, at 131–42 (detailing how the Australian government 
contacted the New Zealand government regarding its compensation scheme and how the 
Australian government modeled its system after New Zealand’s scheme).  
 70. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins of and Economic Structure of 
Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775–90 (1982) (detailing the history of 
Workers’ Compensation and its effect on other compensation schemes).  
 71. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1–21 (2005) (detailing how 
the medical societies got tort reform passed to make it harder for plaintiffs to file medical 
malpractice suits); Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 393–96 (2005) (describing the effect insurance underwriting has 
had on medical malpractice reform).  
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argued, may be justified by non-monetary benefits resulting from the 
individualization of claims at common law.72 
All of this should be conceded, but none of it undermines an argument 
that in certain types of claims the tying of compensation to a tort claim is 
baleful.73  This had led to the non-fault scheme set up under the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.74  At the time, legislators were 
concerned that the pursuit of tort remedies would crimp the goal of 
research, development, and distribution of drugs to the detriment of public 
health.75  Though Congress was confident in the energy industry’s ability to 
persevere in the face of liability, the fund established under the OPA was 
purposed to similar ends, i.e., to deliver compensation by an industry 
through an established fund and to provide it at a price that would not 
unduly dampen the business of oil.76  It is testament to the dimension of the 
BP spill and its political impact that BP was quick to insist that it would not 
avail itself of the limits of liability.77 
With GCCF, no claimant is obliged to make a claim through the fund.  
On the contrary, all are free, and no doubt will be told even more explicitly 
now to proceed through class action or otherwise.  Although Judge Barbier 
was concerned about making sure that certain warnings were  transmitted to 
claimants, his order says nothing about providing claimants with 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 72–92 (1993) (describing the 
lawyer/client relationships for medical malpractice suits); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the 
Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:  Experiences With the 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008) (examining the differences between a cash payment 
from the victim compensation fund and the pursuit of litigation for victims of 9/11).  
 73. In an area well away from property and personal loss, one sees the same concern 
with liability for defamation chilling speech.  See Daniel Farber, Free Speech Without 
Romance:  Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991). 
 74. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–300aa-33 
(2006).  
 75. In product liability cases relating to drugs, the courts have been concerned about 
trammeling discovery and distribution of generally beneficial drugs.  See Anderson v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991). For recent academic 
commentary arguing for the restrictive influence of tort liability, see George L. Priest, The 
Effects of Modern Tort Law on Innovation and Economic Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH: 
PROMOTING INNOVATION ON GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM, THE KAUFFMAN TASK 
FORCE ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 273–76 (2011). 
 76. See S. REP. NO. 101-94 (1989).  
 77. Perhaps it shows that some of the statutory schemes setting caps are not in 
extremis viable.  This would have an impact on the insurability of enterprises involved in 
these hazardous industries.  See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern 
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521–26 (1987) (describing the changes in commercial 
casualty insurance markets during 1986).  
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information about the hazards of proceeding outside the GCCF.  To rely 
upon the claimants’ counsel, avid to recruit for the class, even though they 
are ethically restrained to disclose risks and pitfalls of the litigation, is 
naïve.  Just as Mr. Feinberg or the GCCF may have a bias in favor of giving 
an unbalanced appraisal of the advantages of the trust fund, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have a similar bias in favor of their own interests.  The Court, in 
exercise of its powers, by parity of reasoning ought to provide a means by 
which claimants can rationally assess all of the necessary considerations 
and interests.  Class actions notoriously empower plaintiffs’ lawyers to the 
endangerment of their clients.  The process compounds the vulnerability of 
claimants that tort law was designed to secure.78 
In encouraging BP to establish the trust fund, the Federal Government 
dipped its hand in the water to quell the uproar in public opinion.  It seems 
appropriate that, having entered the fray, it should now help ensure that 
claimants receive unbiased advice.  For example, the government could 
enlist a panel of experts to provide an analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking particular courses of action.  Such advice would be 
entirely impartial and would bear a mark of legitimacy.  As a rough gauge, 
our sense is that claimants with modest losses and marginal claims would 
be best served by the GCCF process.  Those with large dollar claims that 
fall within clear liability boundaries may prosper more in litigation, 
particularly if super-compensatory damages could be garnered.  But much 
depends on claimants’ utility curves and the time value of money.  The 
Exxon Valdez litigation lasted for many years, and then the U.S. Supreme 
Court restricted the scope of punitive damage awards.79 
                                                                                                                 
 78. The problem of conflicting interests between attorneys and class action clients is 
much debated.  See AM. LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
(2010).  The inherent problems have led to alternative schemes.  See RICHARD A. 
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 1–50 (2007) (detailing the huge class 
action personal injury lawsuits against major companies and how those settlements 
transformed the tort system).   
 79. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (finding that the 
maximum award of punitive damages allowed under maritime law was equal to jury’s award 
of $507.5 million in compensatory damages); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon 
Valdez Litigation Marathon:  A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 44–
46 (2009) (discussing the residual unpredictability of punitive awards in the wake of the 
Exxon decision).  Judge Barbier has determined that the OPA does not pre-empt punitive 
damages.  See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on 
Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 3805746, at *14–15 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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IV.  A Model:  Fiduciary Obligations 
With the creation of the GCCF as an escrow account for BP’s 
liabilities, the opportunity was lost to establish a fund that could have more 
efficiently dealt with the bulk of the claims.  The missing ingredient was 
trust—that has been revealed by Judge Barbier’s findings regarding Mr. 
Feinberg’s role and obligations, and the publicity around the paying out of 
claims to date.  Indeed, there is significant evidence that a number of 
claimants are refusing to accept final claims (which would require them to 
issue a liability release) and opting instead to take only the interim 
payment. 
The trust structure could have been used to great effect.  Essentially, 
BP as settlor should have given up control of the fund to the Trustees who 
could have employed Mr. Feinberg as their agent for the payment of claims.  
The fund should have been segregated from BP’s efforts to settle other 
claims.  The claimants, once their claims have been paid out, would have 
been owed fiduciary duties by Mr. Feinberg as an agent of the trustees.  If 
there were to be an indemnity for Mr. Feinberg, it should not come from BP 
funds, but from trust funds.  And the indemnity should not cover fraudulent 
actions but only actions taken in good faith exercise of his discretion. 
Claimants are attracted to courts of law because, among other things, 
of the individual attention given to them.80  However, it is apparent that 
under the MDL class action the claims will perforce of their numbers and 
complexity will be bureaucratized.  Therefore, the comparison for claimants 
is between two rather impersonal choices, both with a basis to argue 
legitimately for independence in decision making.  The Courts have it by 
tradition; the GCCF—properly constituted—would have gained legitimacy 
through patent mechanisms designed to inspire confidence and trust.  
Victims of the spill would then have before them a meaningful choice about 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 72–92 (stating that claimants seek courts for 
medical malpractice suits to get personal, thorough review of their case).  The necessary 
bureaucratization of claims is admitted by Judge Barbier in In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 
3805746 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2011).  Judge Barbier stated: 
A judge handling an MDL often must employ special procedures and case 
management tools in order to have the MDL operate in an orderly and efficient 
manner.  In this massive and complex MDL, the Court is faced with a significant 
practical problem.  It would be impractical, time-consuming, and disruptive to 
the orderly conduct of  this MDL . . . if the Court or the parties were required to 
sort through in excess of 100,000 individual [relevant claims] to determine 
which ones should be dismissed at the current time. 
Id. at *16. 
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how to proceed.  At the same time, the defendants, BP and others, would 
have had a better prospect of emerging within a reasonable time from the 
shadow of impending claims.81 
V.  Designing a Compensation Scheme:  Restitutionary Rights 
and Obligations 
In this final section of the Article, we suggest a better design for a 
compensation fund.  Some of the principles could be adopted for the GCCF 
arrangement.  Of course, the ultimate challenge for the designers of the 
fund and for Mr. Feinberg is how to attract claimants to the GCCF process 
rather than encouraging them to take their chances outside the fund through 
representation in court by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  In an economic sense, 
claimants should be encouraged to consider seriously whether individual 
claimants are better off working with Mr. Feinberg or the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.  In other words, claimants should be encouraged to think about 
which system offers claimants lower agency costs, better services, and 
better compensation.  The utility curve of different classes of claimants will 
vary and this makes it challenging to define an efficient system. 
In the common law system, small claims tend to be overcompensated 
because defendants (usually insurance companies) have a strong incentive 
to purge small "nuisance" claims from their books.  For these claims to be 
processed and settled expeditiously by the GCCF would appear to be 
advantageous to all.  This justifies Mr. Feinberg’s latest option to claimants 
that reads as follows: 
There is a separate option for those claimants who want to file a Final 
Claim and who previously received an Emergency Advance Payment.  
Such claimants may apply for a Quick Payment Final Claim.  This is an 
expedited procedure, which offers a fixed amount of $5,000 for 
individuals and $25,000 for businesses to finally resolve their Final 
Claims.  Under the Quick Payment Final Claim process, you do not 
have to document your final claim.  Do not elect the Quick Payment 
Final Claim process unless you are willing to accept the fixed payment 
of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses and to sign a full 
release of liability.  If you sign a release of liability, you will not be able 
                                                                                                                 
 81. The Court’s assault on the GCCF may have perverse consequences.  It is likely 
that Mr. Feinberg will now want to show his independent plumage whenever possible to 
counteract perceptions of being in BP’s pocket.  This is likely to result in settlements that 
may in size and generosity disgruntle BP, whose grumbling may undermine the public’s 
perception of the GCCF’s independence.  The MDL Court has determined that the limitation 
and liability trials shall commence in February, 2012. 
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to seek further compensation from the GCCF, the Coast Guard, or in 
court.82 
The task in designing an effective system is to give prospective 
claimants the assurance that their claims will be fairly dealt with by 
impartial actors and agents.  Claimants know that, if they bring their claims 
in court, they will have the considerable social capital of honest, capable 
institutions to which they can petition for "justice."  But courts are 
ponderous, and in a large class action claim like in the case of the BP oil 
spill, the claims will be numerous and varied.  The class action mechanism 
will streamline claims at the cost of uniformity.  In this way, the process 
tracks the GCCF.  Furthermore, the courts, to the extent they become 
managers of the class action litigation, erode the patina of aloofness from 
the fray that gives assurance to claimants and defendants alike. 
To succeed, the GCCF and Mr. Feinberg will have to show to 
prospective claimants that they are highly trustworthy.  They cannot be seen 
as tools of BP.  Trustworthiness is usually guaranteed through liability rules 
that at their strictest provide that the agent is a fiduciary.  Such well-known 
rules include a prohibition against allowing a fiduciary’s duty to the 
founder of the trust to conflict with his duties to the beneficiaries.83  The 
remedy is powerful, providing for disgorgement of any profits garnered 
even though the beneficiary should suffer no harm.  Thus, if Feinberg is 
conceived of as a fiduciary agent of the prospective claimants, the duty will 
instill confidence of selfless deciding.  (He is entitled to his fee, of course, 
and this is explicitly disclosed on the trust document at the core of the 
GCCF.  The fee however should not come from BP but rather be payable 
by the Fund at the behest of the Trustees.) 
A major issue for claimants is to have confidence that they will be 
dealt with fairly and equitably.  As presently constituted, especially in 
relation to the confidentiality of settlements, the fund does not inspire trust.  
Full disclosure of settlements might discourage and delay the settlement 
process because claimants might delay hoping for better information on 
which to press their claims.  An ignorance of the identity of claimants will 
tend to encourage a rush to settle.  An independent government auditor may 
provide the necessary assurance of fair dealing.  Government auditing is a 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Summary of Options for Submission of Final and 
Interim Payment Claims, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/summary_options.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 83. For an excellent exposition of this law, see PAUL FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
(1977). 
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well recognized mechanism for providing direct monitoring arrangements, 
and this can be accomplished by audits and preestablished performance 
standard, as well as by "indirect" monitoring mechanisms that create 
incentives for due performance.84  The theory was first forcefully 
articulated by Jensen and Meckling.85  We have discussed fiduciary 
obligations but agency costs may also be reduced by pre-commitments to 
performance, capital contributions that would be forfeited in the case of 
breach, covenants not to compete, self-imposed ethical standards, and 
termination clauses. 
Tort liability such as bad-faith breach of contract, inducement to 
breach of contract, and  extended tort-like damages for breach of contract86 
are all ways in which relationships of agency may be sustained.87 
Let us provide an example springing from the tort of inducement to 
breach of contract.88  For the London Opera season of 1852, two 
impresarios, Lumley and Gye, old rivals, vied for supremacy.  After much 
pursuit, Lumley persuaded Wagner, a cantatrice to the King of Prussia and 
niece of Richard, to sing at his theatre, Her Majesty’s Drury Lane in 
London, during the 1852 opera season.  Gye, knowing of the contract, 
offered Ms. Wagner a better deal at Covent Garden.  Note that the contract 
for personal services entered into by Johanna Wagner could not be 
specifically enforced for a variety of reasons.89  However, she could be 
prevented from supplying her services under the contract with Gye because 
the contract contained a negative clause that prevented her from singing for 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 352 (2007) 
(detailing the effects government auditing has on monitoring schemes).  
 85. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–10 (1976) 
(describing their definition of the firm and its effect on agency costs).  
 86. The range of relationships precipitating tort liability for bad faith breach has been 
debated.  Compare Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 990 P. 2d 669 (Cal. 1995) 
(holding that insurance remains the only firm category), with Farley v. Skinner [2002] 2 
A.C. 732 (H.L.) (giving noneconomic damages for breach of contract for an English travel 
agency contract).  American courts have been slower to countenance non-economic damages 
in pure breach of contract. 
 87. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic 
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 
854 (1978).  See in this Symposium the analysis of David Campbell, drawing on the 
relational contract theory.  David Campbell, A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement 
of Restitution § 39, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1063 (2011). 
 88. The facts of the example are taken from Lumley v. Gye.  See David Partlett, From 
Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap:  Inducement to Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 
66 TULANE L. REV. 771, 777–83 (1992) (stating the facts and holding of Lumley v. Gye). 
 89. See id. at 777 (describing Wagner’s singing contract with Lumley’s theater).  
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anyone else.90  But more important, the tort of inducement to breach of 
contract allowed Lumley tort damages for the loss of her services.  In the 
face of the tort, artists in the position of Ms. Wagner will be inveigled away 
only at a considerable premium.  A person wanting to destroy the contract 
will be sure to take account of his potential liability in tort and will in 
negotiations pay for immunity from suit.  The original relationship will 
accordingly be protected.  The tort also tends to discourage free-riding by 
persons like rival impresarios.  To discover and contract with a fine artist 
for her talents is a delicate, expensive, and risky venture, as it was for 
Lumley.  If artists can be inveigled away by rivals, the investments in 
discovery and promotion will be lost.  Therefore, the tort encourages 
investment by overcoming the free-rider problem.91  The same line of 
reasoning supports the new Restatement of Restitution provision that 
provides a remedy for disgorgement for breach of contract.92  For parties 
vulnerable to exploitation, the remedy with its teeth gives an assurance 
against advantage taking as opportunistic behavior in a world of bounded 
rationality93 that would otherwise infect relational contracts where one party 
invests faith in due carriage of the contractual undertakings. 
The significant agency cost problem with the GCCF and the MDL is 
that claimants will have different and perhaps vying interests, as economists 
say "heterogeneous preferences."  Accordingly, the barriers to their 
collective action will cause them to delegate more discretion to the agent, 
and it will be more difficult to ensure that the agent does the "right" thing.94  
                                                                                                                 
 90. See id. ("The court, in Lumley v. Wagner, granted the injunction on the basis of a 
negative covenant that had been inserted into the contract during negotiations in Paris.").  
 91. See id. at 820–21 (describing the premium extracted from Sony Corporation when 
it sought to contract with Peters & Guber, who had a contract with Warner Brothers to 
produce movies.)  Under threat of a tort action, Sony agreed to give over substantial assets to 
procure the services of Peters & Guber, then renowned for their Batman movie success, after 
Peters had been Barbra Streisand’s hairdresser—it was a poor investment.  Id.  
 92. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, A Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary 
Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 945, 978–85 (2008). 
 93. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47–49 (1985) (describing the remedies for breach of 
contract that protect helpless parties);  Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine 
of Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
227, 227–30 (2004) (detailing how the doctrine of impracticability improves the efficiency 
and productivity of long-term contractual agreements). 
 94. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, 39–44 (1996) (describing 
the difficulties class action claimants have in delegating power to agents and supervising the 
agent’s actions); Hideki Kanda, Debt Holders and Equity Holders, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 431, 
440–41, 444–45 (1992) (examining the fiduciary duties agents have to the claimants and 
how the beneficiary of the fiduciary principle in corporate law should be residual claimants). 
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The principals, the claimants, will be unable to directly monitor the agents’ 
behavior, and a bond by way of liability for opportunistic or negligent 
behavior would benefit principle and agent alike.  In the face of 
coordination costs, regulatory strategies are often invoked.  A court or 
regulatory body has the role of determining compliance.  This explains the 
Federal Courts’ function in the class action context in the corporate 
setting.95  Armour, Hansmann, and Kraakman suggest the following 
heuristic: 
Strategies for Protecting Principals96 











      
Ex Ante RULES ENTRY SELECTION INITIATION TRUSTEESHIP 
      
Ex Post STANDARDS EXIT REMOVAL VETO REWARD 
Although the heuristic is designed to explain and help the reader 
understand the geometry of corporate governance and regulation,97 its 
structure helps to clarify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the GCCF 
and class action alternatives.  If one takes "agent incentives," the Ex Post 
reward structure of the BP trust fund (with payment by BP and control by 
BP over the fate of Mr. Feinberg) is corrosive, but so too is the incentive 
structure rewarding plaintiffs’ lawyers.98  On the ex ante axis it would seem 
that Mr. Feinberg’s firm structure is ideal.  His firm has come to specialize 
in this work and he expends much effort in shoring up its reputation for 
reliability and faithful dealing; his firm’s future depends upon a faithful and 
competent performance.  His future stock in the business of running 
compensation schemes is enhanced by building on his performance in the 
past, burnishing his reputation, as well as by his ability to offer legitimate 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1477, 1477–83 (describing the ethics issues faced by class action litigators and how 
those issues should be addressed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 96. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems, Legal 
Strategies and Enforcement, (Oxford Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 21, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555 (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 97. See id. (providing a functional analysis of corporate law in the United States, 
Europe, and Japan). 
 98. For a recent trenchant exposition see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 67. 
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and convincing services in the future.99  The trusteeship element for 
attorneys in the class action is supplied by their ethical constraints, court 
oversight, and reputational jeopardy.  This has been seen by commentators 
as a rather naïve and weak reed.  Given the money at stake, and the 
disparity of power, Congress has moved to strengthen oversight by courts 
of class action plaintiffs.100 
Market mechanisms have also been suggested.101  Rival groups of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers could promise a better performance or a reduced cost.  
Informational asymmetries plague this approach, however.  It may be seen 
that this equation of the compensation fund is a way of introducing a 
competitive monitor so that the monopoly rents of the attorneys can be bid 
down to the benefit of claimants.  It is this competition that has inspired at 
this early date an assault on the GCCF.  Another variant is the judicial 
creation of a temporary administrative agency to monitor more closely, 
even take an active role, in the settlement of complex class actions.102 
Modes of enforcement can be critical, and they include public 
enforcement, private enforcement, and gatekeeper control.  Thus, the GCCF 
could be subject to regulatory agency enforcement of standards, to legal or 
non-legal private norms, or to actors like auditors retained to check on 
agents’ behavior.  In the case of the GCCF, to date at least, media scrutiny 
flowing from the moment of the event has acted to reduce agency costs.  
                                                                                                                 
 99. Feinberg’s voluntary services in the 9/11 Fund serves this function. 
 100. Cf. Moore, supra note 95; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in 
Class Action Litigation:  An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard (NYU Ctr. for Law & 
Bus., Research Paper No. 03-16, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=446942 (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011) (suggesting a test whereby discordant interests may be consolidated) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 101. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669–75 (1986) (explaining the incentives and organizational 
problems facing professional plaintiff’s attorneys who specialize in class and derivative 
litigation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370–90 (2000) (arguing for 
the increase of power to class members’ voice and exit in class litigation instead of forcing a 
rigorous definition of class cohesion). 
 102. See John Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune and Just Compensation: Weinstein on 
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2034–50 (1997) (comparing Judge Jack Weinstein’s low 
damage amounts to tort law and distributive justice); Martha Minow, The Judge for the 
Situation:  Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2010–25 (1997) (describing Judge Jack Weinstein’s activist efforts to 
include all potentially affected parties in class litigation, calling it the ‘temporary 
administrative agency’); Richard Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 899, 899–930 (1996) (arguing that the rise of massive tort settlements mimics the 
development of public administrative agencies). 
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The concern is that this scrutiny may fade over time and is subject to 
distortion.  The public is fickle as new events crowd out the old.  
A full discussion of agency cost concerns would be lengthy.  It is plain 
that where large class actions are permitted, the possibility that plaintiff’s 
lawyers may take advantage of the system by reaching settlements that suit 
their self-interest rather than the interests of their clients is apparent.103  
Given the advantages of class actions, the task is to ameliorate the agency 
costs.  The operation of one mechanism can be seen at work in the BP Spill 
in the order of the Federal Court for the GCCF to clarify its status.  The 
Court is given the task of monitoring the process to ensure fairness.  Other 
methods can also control costs, including mechanisms designed to create 
economic incentives by way of auctions for representative services to 
diffuse monopoly rents and to help ensure that plaintiffs are not 
disadvantaged by lawyers feathering their own nests.104 
The concerns of claimants will be difficult to define ex ante as they are 
like long-term contracts where conditions may change.  With the obstacles 
of monitoring for such requirements or standards as "fair-dealing" between 
claimants, a regulatory solution may make sense.  For example, Congress 
could establish a legislative framework for voluntary compensation 
schemes by appointing a public auditor, or private auditors publicly 
appointed and licensed, who are charged with the task of assuring the 
parties of due compliance.  Such a legislative structure would encourage the 
establishment of compensation schemes. 
What of liability rules that will enforce compliance?  These would be 
established ex ante to allow ex post aggrieved parties to enforce the 
standards.  If the claims administrator owes fiduciary obligations, the duty 
of loyalty will place claimants’ interests above those of the settlor, BP.  
Moreover, the claims administrator will be prohibited from arbitrarily 
promoting the interests of some claimants over those of others.  
Clear priority rules will encourage claimants to "invest."  But the 
presently fuzzy indicators of the way in which claims will be resolved and 
paid and the confidentiality cloak on settlements, will cause claimant to shy 
away.  It is here that accountability for allocative decisions will be aided by 
resort to restitution rights. 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Erickson & Zipursky supra note 67, at 266–92 (examining the problems of the 
Vioxx settlement).  
 104. Cf. Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 
IND. L. REV. 65, 115–40 (2004) (offering a transformation to class action governance by 
adding stronger disclosure requirements and giving decision-makers more independence). 
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As suggested earlier, one agency cost mechanism would be for the 
GCCF to be structured to ensure that Mr. Feinberg would owe clear duties 
as a fiduciary to those persons who have agreed to a final payment.  
Fiduciary duties are well defined and will guard against any nondisclosed 
interest that would clash with his duty to the claimant.  Such an 
arrangement would differ markedly from the present structure of the GCCF, 
whereby Mr. Feinberg is neither a trustee of the fund nor an agent of the 
claimants, and, in any event, is personally indemnified by BP by an 
instrument external to the Trust Agreement.  Owing fiduciary duties, Mr. 
Feinberg would be required to deal fairly and equitably with the claimants, 
subject to the various strictures of either the law of agency105 (were the 
Administrator considered the claimants’ agent in their dealings with the 
fund), or the law of trusts106 (were the Administrator repurposed as a trustee 
of the fund).  He could not distribute funds except on a rational and 
reasonable basis pursuant to the duty of loyalty, a requirement that drives 
toward a clearer articulation of the basis by which payments are to be made.  
The law of restitution would create a basis for the fiduciary-Administrator’s 
liability to claimants for the benefit of any breach.107 
In addition to such rights against the Administrator, claimants would 
have restitution claims where they could claim an equitable right to a 
payment in priority to other claimants.  The Restatement of the Law (Third) 
of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Section 48 considers the existence of 
equitable priorities between independent obligees, where both parties have 
an independent right to payment from a third-party obligor.108  Take the 
example of the Claimants who have received Final Payment and have 
forfeited their rights to sue at Common Law.  Here, the priorities of 
Claimant A and Claimant B could be judged inter se, as where Claimant A’s 
underlying entitlement to payment is paramount to that of Claimant B’s.  
Where there is no statute or recognized rule concerning priority of 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (concerning the agent’s role 
as fiduciary, his duty of loyalty, and his duty of performance).  
 106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76–84 (concerning the specific duties of 
trusteeship such as duty of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality).  The duty imposed by 
Section 78, for instance—a duty to communicate all material facts to the beneficiaries—
would have obviated the Louisiana order requiring more complete disclosure on the part of 
the GCCF. 
 107. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing Section 43). 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 48 cmt. d 
("Each of them, rather, has an independent right to a payment that has been received by the 
defendant from a third-party obligor; yet if the equities of the parties are judged inter se, the 
right of the claimant is superior to the right of the defendant."). 
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payments  rom the GCCF, "the priority of one entitlement over another can 
only be determined by comparing the individualized equities of the particular 
claimants."109  The question then becomes how to rank the competing 
interests of the claimants:  Is the stronger claim to the trust’s corpus founded 
upon the directness of proximate causation?  The date of a claimant’s 
application to the trust?  The date of the application’s perfection with respect 
to Mr. Feinberg’s evidentiary requirements?  The size of the claim?  The type 
of damages claimed? 
As the structure of the fund now stands, no priorities are established to 
give rise to equities between GCCF claimants.  However, if priorities were 
established, Claimant A—taking funds as a final settlement out of the order 
stipulation—would be liable to a restitution claim by Claimant B who had 
priority.  Say, for example, that the Trustee imposes the requirement for A, 
but does not use it to limit B’s recovery.  Let us hasten to add that if the 
Administrator has funds to make all Claimants whole in a final distribution of 
funds according to the priorities that claims under Section 48, A’s claim will 
be pursued against the trustee rather than through restitution.  But such 
largess will be rare. 
If either a restitution or trust matter, the next issue is whether the funds 
so marshaled have found their way to the hands of the claimants who have 
less priority or no claim at all.  If they have, then the Restatement might allow 
recovery against either the claims administrator, as fiduciary, or the claimant 
him/herself.  In particular, Section 43 provides as follows: 
A person who obtains a benefit: 
(a) in breach of a fiduciary duty, 
(b) in breach of an equivalent duty imposed by a relation of trust and 
confidence, or 
(c) in consequence of another’s breach of such a duty, is liable in 
restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.110 
There are two possible scenarios in which restitutionary claims might 
arise.  The first is the situation in which a claimant has filed a false or 
fraudulent claim, and the Administrator pays the claim without realizing the 
fraud.  This situation could arise in an array of contexts.  For example, 
suppose that a shrimper claims a dramatic loss in revenue attributable to the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See id. cmt. h. 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43.  See also 
Campbell, supra note 87; Caprice Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 
68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1027 (2011). 
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BP Oil Spill.  In particular, the shrimper claims that he was not allowed to 
fish for a considerable period of time, and therefore was unable to support 
himself or to make a living.  In support of his claim, the shrimper submits 
records to the Trustee showing revenue for the years before the oil spill, 
as well as records showing the dramatic decline in revenue.  As a result, 
the Administrator compensates the shrimper for the lost income.  
However, unbeknownst to the Trustee, the shrimper’s drop in revenue had 
nothing to do with the environmental contamination, but rather was due to 
the fact that his boat had gone beyond its useful life and could no longer 
be used.  In other words, with or without the oil spill, the shrimper would 
have seen a dramatic drop in revenue because he had no boat and 
therefore could not engage in shrimping. 
Of course, the shrimp example provides only one example of fraud.  
A fraudulent claim could also be submitted by an oceanfront hotelier that 
submitted documentation of revenue for the years before the oil spill, and 
the year after, and claimed that a dramatic drop in revenue was directly 
attributable to the oil spill (e.g., either the beach in front of the hotel was 
spoiled by tar, or the public perceived that the beach was spoiled by the 
tar and went elsewhere).  In fact, the hotel was under renovation at the 
time of the BP oil spill, and had taken a large number of its rooms out of 
inventory.  As a result, the revenue decline was attributable to the 
renovations rather than to the oil spill.  Or suppose that an individual who 
lives near the Gulf claims that she fishes the Gulf to provide food for her 
family, and asks for compensation for loss of the subsistence that she and 
her family had drawn from the Gulf.  Because there are no records of this 
subsistence, the Administrator accepts the individual’s affidavit regarding 
her subsistence practices.  In fact, the individual does not do subsistence 
fishing, and decided to submit a claim only after learning about the fact 
that some of his neighbors had succeeded in obtaining money from the BP 
Oil Trust by making subsistence allegations. 
Now suppose that a legitimate claimant fairly documents his claims 
and accepts a Final Payment with a waiver, but comes to regard his 
payment as insufficient given the payments made to others who 
submitted fraudulent claims.  He submits a request for reconsideration to 
the Trustee, but the fund is now exhausted.  Accordingly, he debates 
whether to pursue a claim against the fraudulent claimants.  How does 
the legitimate claimant find out about the fraudulent claims?  Suppose 
that the New York Times conducts an investigation of the BP Oil Trust 
and publishes a lengthy expose detailing fraud by individuals like the 
shrimper, the hotelier, and the private individual who recovered for 
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subsistence.  Some of the payments made to the fraudulent claimants were 
quite large.  The hotelier (who had 200 rooms) might have received 
compensation in the millions.  Other claims (the individual who sought 
compensation for the loss of subsistence) might have a claim that is much 
smaller.  Nevertheless, based on the New York Times article, the claimant 
has reason to believe that lots of fraudulent subsistence claims were 
submitted, and that the total payout for these claims was quite large. 
Section 43 would seem to permit the disappointed claimant to recover 
against both the Administrator (for breach of fiduciary duty) and against 
those who made the fraudulent claims.  If the Administrator was not 
diligent in ensuring that claims were not fraudulently submitted, there may 
well be a breach of his quasi-fiduciary obligations.  The Administrator 
would be required to disgorge his benefit in the entire transaction as a 
strong deterrent; indeed, Section 43 seems to suggest that such recovery 
might be appropriate. 
Another scenario in which recovery might be allowed is if the 
Administrator errs in evaluating the relative claims, in determining whether 
causation really exists, and in assessing priorities between claimants.  Let 
us assume that the Administrator, in a well-drawn scheme where priorities 
in payment of economic losses are patent, decides to provide recovery for 
mere economic loss.  In that situation, it might be quite clear that one 
applicant’s claim on the BP Trust is quite strong and deserves to be paid.  
For example, there was a period of time when fishing vessels were not 
allowed to fish in the Gulf for fear that their catch would be contaminated.  
Suppose, for example, that fishing boats are unemployed because the oil 
spill contaminated the waters and potentially contaminated their catch.  As 
a result, a number of individuals and companies were thrown out of work.  
Their claims to compensation might be quite strong under traditional 
recovery principles. 
The claims of a hotelier in Florida, who alleges that the oil spill 
discouraged potential customers from staying at his resort, may be 
considerably more speculative, and less justifiable.  Indeed, there may be 
other possible explanations for a decline in the Florida hotelier’s occupancy 
rate, including a significant decline in economic activity.  So, if the 
Administrator fails to sufficiently distinguish between claimants, and the 
trust fund is unable to pay all deserving claims, more deserving claimants 
may claim that the Trustee breached his fiduciary obligations by failing to 
be sufficiently careful in the payment of claims. 
Of course, the amount of the recovery against either the Administrator 
or against other claimants will depend upon circumstances.  The Restatement 
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distinguishes between claimants based on their blameworthiness.  Section 43, 
Comment h provides: 
Disgorgement liability by the rule of § 43 is not restricted to 
conscious wrongdoers.  In contrast to the property-based rules of §§ 40–
42, the prophylactic aims of fiduciary duty require a fiduciary to 
disgorge profits (including consequential gains) even if the breach of 
duty is inadvertent. . . .  The same liability is imposed on a third party 
who acquires a benefit with notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. . . .  
By contrast, an innocent third party who obtains property as a result of 
another’s breach of trust is liable to make restitution of what has been 
received but not for consequential gains.111 
Based on this language, those who submitted fraudulent claims to the 
Trustee could be required to disgorge because they accepted monies "with 
notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty."112  Even those who were unaware 
of the wrong (e.g., those who recover because the Trustee failed to 
sufficiently distinguish between claimants) might be required to disgorge, 
but they would only be responsible for "what has been received but not for 
consequential gains."113 
Of course, even if recovery is allowed, courts may face difficult issues 
in determining the amount that a particular claimant should receive, and 
there may not be clear answers about how the court should dole out any 
monies that are recovered.  If the overall trust fund proves inadequate to 
satisfy all legitimate claims, a given legitimate claimant may be simply one 
of many similarly situated legitimate individuals, and it is unclear that the 
plaintiff in a restitution action should receive full recovery while others 
(who did not) receive no extra funds.  The BP Oil Trust is a $20 billion trust 
fund, and we are told that the funds are more than adequate.  But this will 
not always be the case with all compensation schemes.  Suppose that, of 
those directly affected by a disaster, there are total legitimate claims of $25 
billion.  Is it really fair to allow the plaintiff (as one member of the class) to 
receive full recovery while others (also members of the same class) receive 
only a partial recovery? 
It may be said that any dissatisfied claimant can simply go to her rights 
at common law.  This is passing strange, however, should the fund 
advertise itself as a superior compensation vehicle.  And it follows from our 
                                                                                                                 
 111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. h. See 
generally Alan Berg, Accessory Liability for Procuring or Assisting a Breach of Trust, 111 
LAW Q. REV. 545 (1995). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. h. 
 113. Id. 
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argument that the fund must be viewed by a significant class of claimants as 
superior if it is to succeed in its underlying objective. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Although restitution rules are most often seen as a private law 
mechanism for achieving corrective or commutative justice,114 we have 
shown that they play an indispensable role in the design of an effective 
compensation scheme.  Along with reassurances of reputation and other 
social and market norms, liability rules, as outlined, with restitutionary 
remedies, make up the substance of a well-designed scheme.  It is this 
instrumental role that we highlight here, and that role is not akin to 
restitution’s private role and function elsewhere.115 
We hope that the missteps in the BP Oil and GCCF scheme—
especially the problem of failing to clarify the trustee’s relative obligations 
and responsibilities—will encourage those who set up future compensation 
schemes to opt for templates that are more responsive to agency costs.  The 
Restatement provisions, because of their careful articulation of trust and 
restitutionary rules, provide salutary guidance in a field that has seemed far 
from the usual concerns of fiduciary duties, mistake, and fraud.  Their 
prophylactic role should not be forgotten. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 114. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT 419–
44 (2006) (describing how restitution and unjust enrichment principles are used to make the 
person whole again). 
 115. Indeed, as Professor Andrew Kull reminded us in his remarks recalling Professor 
Weinrib’s observation, "restitution is the private parts of private law." 

